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This paper studies household beliefs during the recent US housing boom. The first part presents evidence
from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. To characterize the heterogeneity in households' views about
housing and the economy, we perform a cluster analysis on survey responses at different stages of
the boom. The estimation always finds a small cluster of households who believe it is a good time
to buy a house because house prices will rise further. The size of this "momentum" cluster doubled
towards the end of the boom. The second part of the paper provides a simple search model of the housing
market to show how a small number of optimistic investors can have a large effect on prices without
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This paper studies household beliefs during the recent US housing boom. The ﬁrst part
presents evidence from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. To characterize the heterogeneity
in households’ views about housing and the economy, we perform a cluster analysis on survey
responses at diﬀerent stages of the boom. The estimation always ﬁnds a small cluster of
households who believe it is a good time to buy a house because house prices will rise
further. The size of this “momentum” cluster doubled towards the end of the boom. The
second part of the paper provides a simple search model of the housing market to show how
a small number of optimistic investors can have a large eﬀect on prices without buying a
large share of the housing stock.
The raw survey data suggest that the housing boom had two distinct phases. During
the early boom years 2002-3, a large and increasing fraction of households believed that the
time for buying a house was good. This fraction peaked at 85.2 percent in 2003:Q2. The
most important reason — cited by up to 72 percent of households — was favorable credit
conditions. At the same time, by these measures, enthusiasm about housing and credit was
actually slightly weaker than at previous peaks during the last 25 years.
In a second phase of the boom, during 2004-2005, overall enthusiasm about housing and
credit was already waning, and houses were increasingly viewed as “too expensive”. However,
the number of agents who believed that prices would go up further increased from 10 percent
in 2003:Q4 to over 20 percent in 2005:Q2, a 25 year high. It thus appears that the boom was
initially driven by a familiar force, namely good credit conditions. What was unusual about
the recent boom is the increased belief in rising prices, which occurred precisely at the time
1when prices rose to their historical highs.
To look for clusters of opinions on housing and the economy, we estimate a mixture
density on survey responses to questions about housing, business conditions, inﬂation and
interest rates. Conditional on a cluster, survey responses are assumed to be independent
across questions. The role of the clusters is to introduce correlation — they may capture
common “views of the world” that are reﬂected in the responses to many questions.
In the estimations for both phases of the boom, one cluster contains “gloomy” agents
who forecast low economic growth and who are negative about housing. A second cluster
is optimistic about both housing and the economy, and cites favorable credit conditions as
a reason for optimism about housing. A third cluster is also generally optimistic. However,
its optimism about housing is based less on credit conditions, and more on an expected rise
in house prices. The size of this “momentum” cluster increases from 10 percent in the early
phase of the boom to 16 percent in the late phase.
The second part of the paper considers the role of a small number of optimistic traders
on house prices. For the stock market, there is a standard argument for why even a small
number of optimists can push up prices in the presence of short-sales constraints (Edward
Miller 1977.) Indeed, if investors are risk neutral and have unlimited wealth, and if stock
cannot be sold short, then the competitive equilibrium price reﬂects the subjective valuation
of the most optimistic investors in the market. Those investors use their wealth to buy up all
stocks in equilibrium. Less optimistic investors would like to short stock, but are constrained
from doing so. As a result, they simply sell all stock to optimists at inﬂated prices.
While the standard argument is plausible for segments of the stock market where shorting
is diﬃcult (such as recent IPO shares), it does not work for the housing market: we do not
observe a small number of optimistic speculators buying up all houses. One likely reason
2is that transaction costs are much higher in the housing market. Moreover, unlike stocks,
houses are not standardized assets traded in highly competitive markets. Instead, households
search for individual houses that suit them and bargain with sellers over the price. Once
they have found a suitable house they cannot easily exchange it for another equivalent house.
The fact that optimists cannot easily buy many houses might suggest that they have a
smaller eﬀect on the price.1 However, in a search market, the recorded price reﬂects only the
transactions that actually take place. What matters for a boom is thus not optimists’ share
of total market capitalization, but optimists’ share in the volume of transactions. In the
housing market, a market where volume is much lower than in the stock market, optimists
can drive up the price while spending much less wealth and obtaining a far smaller market
share. In Section 4 below we use a simple search model to illustrate the relationship between
the number of momentum investors, transaction costs, volume, and prices.
II. Housing Boom and Reasons for Buying a House
Panel A in Figure 1 illustrates the housing boom episode that we focus on in this paper.
The ﬁgure plots the price-dividend ratio for housing: the aggregate market value of residential
real estate in the United States (from the Flow of Funds) divided by NIPA expenditures on
housing services. The ratio ﬂuctuates around its average of 16 during the 1980s and 1990s,
stays consistently above average after 2002, and peaks in early 2006. The market value
of homes is determined by collecting recent transaction prices and applying them to similar
homes that have not been on the market for a while. Importantly, the number of transactions
in the housing market is much smaller relative to the number of outstanding homes than
in other asset markets. According to the American Housing Survey, 6 percent of owner-
1In fact, if agents in the simple (frictionless) competitive model are constrained to hold one house per
person, then a small number of optimists does not move the price: for the market to clear, there must be as
m a n yb u y e r sa sh o u s e s .
3occupied homes are traded per year. In contrast, on the New York Stock Exchange, annual
volume divided by market capitalization is 120 percent.
How did households view the recent boom in the housing market? The Michigan Survey
of Consumers asks "Generally speaking, do you think now is a good time or a bad time to
buy a house?" The fraction of household who answered “now is a good time” is plotted in
Panel B of Figure 1. Many of its ﬂuctuations reﬂect the business cycle. In the recent boom,
it peaked at 85.2 percent in 2003:Q2, about two years before the peak of the boom. Inter-
estingly, enthusiasm about housing during the recent boom was not unusual when compared
to previous peaks.
In a follow-up question, households are asked “Why do you say so?”. Households are
asked to give up to two reasons, and about one half of households cite two reasons. The
question is open-ended and the data contain many diﬀerent reasons cited by survey respon-
dents. We group responses by three issues: current credit conditions, the current level of
house prices, and the expected future change in house prices. In their responses, households
point to issues as either good or bad for buying a home — for example, a response could be
“it is a good time to buy because credit is cheap”, or “it is a bad time to buy because credit
is hard to get”.
We deﬁne a household’s view of an issue as positive or negative according to its implica-
tions for buying a house: for example, the household has a positive view of current prices if
he cites low prices as a reason for buying, and he has a positive view of the expected change
in prices if he cites rising prices as a reason for buying. We say that the household has no
view if he does not cite a reason related to the issue, which suggests that he does not believe
the issue to be important. Figure 1 plots, for each issue, the fraction of households who have
a positive view of the issue.
4Many households express the view that credit conditions are good (by citing reasons such
as "interest rates are low", "credit is easy to get".) The ﬁgure shows that credit conditions
have always been major driver of households’ overall thinking about housing; this reason
was not special to the recent housing boom. At the beginning of the recent boom, around
2 0p e r c e n to fh o u s e h o l d se x p r e s st h ev i e wt h a t current house prices are low. This fraction
later declined as house prices rose.
The third issue is the expected change in house prices. Here positive answers include,
for example, “house prices are going up”, “capital appreciation”, and “housing is a good
investment”. On average, 9.2 percent of households are optimistic about future house prices.
Figure 1 also shows that, starting in 2004, more and more households became optimistic after
having watched house prices increase for several years. The percentage of these momentum
traders r o s et oa2 5y e a rh i g ho f2 0 . 2p e r c e n ti n2 0 0 5 : Q 2 .
The goal of cluster analysis to understand whether household survey responses can be
described by a small number of “types” who share similar views about the economy. We pick
six variables. First, we consider responses to three questions about households’ expectations
of business conditions, interest rates, and inﬂation one year ahead. The answers can be
"higher/better", "lower/worse", or "same". Second, we include the views about credit and
house prices, as derived above by recoding the reasons households give for their view about
housing.
Table I presents parameter estimates for a mixture density with three clusters. House-
holds are drawn into a cluster with a cluster probability, which also represents the share
of the cluster in the population. Conditional on a cluster, survey responses are assumed
to be independent across households and questions. The probabilities of each response are
constant within clusters but diﬀerent across clusters.
5The estimated clusters are similar in both phases of the boom. There is always one cluster
— cluster 1 in both panels of Table 1 — that contains households who are “gloomy” both about
future economic growth and about housing. Table 1 shows that, in the early phase of the
boom, only 31 percent of households in cluster 1 forecast higher growth, compared to roughly
45 percent in the other clusters, and this fraction further declines to 19 percent in the late
phase of the boom.
A second cluster consists of households who are positive about housing because they
b e l i e v et h a tc r e d i tc o n d i t i o n sa r eg o o da n dc urrent house prices are low. A third cluster
essentially picks out the momentum traders — households who are positive about housing
because they expect house prices to rise. These agents end up in a cluster by themselves
since they care much less about credit and the level of house prices. In the late phase of the
boom, the “momentum” cluster is larger. Interestingly, there are no systematic diﬀerences
between clusters in terms of beliefs about interest rates and inﬂation. However, enthusiasm
about housing always go along with optimism about economic conditions.
In terms of demographics, momentum traders are not strongly diﬀerent from the rest of
the population. They are somewhat older and richer, more likely to be male and have a col-
lege degree, and have fewer children. However, as is common in the literature, demographic
characteristics explain little of the variation in beliefs (e.g., in a multinomial logit regression,
the pseudo-R2 is essentially zero.)
III. Optimists in a search model of the housing market
We consider a simple search model of the housing market, inspired by the contributions
of William Wheaton (1990) and John Krainer (2001). The goal is to illustrate how a small
number of optimists can drive up the average transaction price without a large increase in
trading volume or in their market share.
6Setup
Time is continuous and there is continuum of inﬁnitely-lived households of measure 1.
Households care for two goods. Numeraire consumption can be purchased in a frictionless
spot market. Housing services are derived from indivisible housing units that must be bought
in a search market. Households may own at most one house. Utility is quasilinear in housing
and other consumption, and households discount the future at the constant rate r.
We introduce preference shocks to capture typical reasons for moving that are unrelated
to price dynamics, such as changing jobs. In particular, when a household purchases a house,
he is initially a “happy owner” who obtains housing services at the rate v. However, he may
be hit by a shock that makes him an “unhappy” owner who no longer obtains any services
from the house. He can then sell the house and purchase a new one to again begin obtaining
housing services. The preference shock that makes a household unhappy is driven by a
Poisson process with arrival rate η. A household thus receives a moving shock on average
every 1/η years.
A ta n yp o i n ti nt i m e ,t h e r ea r ea tm o s tt h r e et y p e so fa g e n t si nt h ee c o n o m y . L e tμH
and μU denote the number of happy and unhappy owners, respectively, and let μR denote
the number of “renters” who do not own a house. Homeowners decide whether or not to put
their house up for sale, which entails costs at the rate c. Renters decide whether to search
for a house, which is free. If μS houses are for sale and μB households are searching, houses
and potential buyers are matched at the rate M(μB,μ S)=mμα
Bμ
1−α
S . Once a house for sale
is matched with a (potential) buyer, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave it oﬀer for a trade,
and the buyer accepts or rejects the oﬀer.
The supply of houses is ﬁxed at h<1. Renters’ and owners’ strategies specify prob-
abilities of searching and putting the house up for sale, respectively. An equilibrium is a
7collection of strategies such that (i) each agent’s strategy is optimal given other households’
strategies (payoﬀs depend on what others do via the matching process), and (ii) the number
of homeowners (happy plus unhappy) is equal to h at all dates. We focus on symmetric equi-
libria in which the probability of taking an action depends only on the current individual
state (happy, unhappy, or renter) as well as calendar time.
We ﬁrst consider a steady state in which the population weights μ are constant. We
choose parameters such that only unhappy households put their houses up for sale, and all
renters search for a house, that is, μB = μR =1− h and μS = μU. In equilibrium, the
number of households who begin searching (because they become unhappy with their house)
must be equal to the number of households who stop searching because they are matched:




This condition uniquely determines the equilibrium number of unhappy agents. It is increas-
ing in η, the rate at which households become unhappy. It is also decreasing in m —t h e
faster unhappy sellers are matched with buyers, the fewer households are unhappy in steady
state.
We assume that in the steady state selling and buying take the same amount of time
o na v e r a g e . T h ea v e r a g et i m ef o rah o u s et ob es o l di sμU/M, and the average time for a
searcher to ﬁnd a house is μR/M;w et h u sr e q u i r eμU = μR. We then obtain a simple formula






r + η + m
v + c
r
The ﬁrst term is the present value of the dividends that would be obtained if the house were
always held by a happy owner. The second term is a discount that compensates the buyer for
8the inconvenience of future search. Indeed, the buyer knows that once he becomes unhappy
he will not be able to sell the house immediately, but will have to forego dividends and
incur search costs during the moving process. The discount vanishes as matching becomes
inﬁnitely fast (m →∞ ).
We choose parameters so that steady state trading and prices are roughly consistent
with averages from the American Housing Survey. On average since 1983, about 6 percent
of owner-occupied houses are traded per year, and the inventory of houses outstanding is
about 3 percent. We thus set (1 − h)/h, the equilibrium share of houses on the market,
equal to 0.03. In addition, we set 1/m, the average time to sell a house, equal to 0.03/0.06
years, or 6 months. The parameter η is pinned down by the requirement that μU = μR.W e
obtain η =0 .062, which implies that a household becomes unhappy on average after about
16 years.2
We normalize the dividend rate to v =1 . The seller’s cost c is hard to pin down. It
incorporates not only direct transaction cost but also further nonpecuniary costs incurred in
the moving process. To put it in perspective, we consider the total cost incurred during an
average sale, that is, c/2, as a fraction of the value of the house. As a baseline case, we set
this fraction to 10 percent. Given a value for the cost fraction, we choose the interest rate r
to obtain a steady state price dividend ratio of 16, the average since 1983. In the baseline
case, the implied interest rate is r =5 .48 p e r c e n ta n dt h ec o s ti sc =3 .2.
To study the price impact of a small number of momentum investors, we now consider
2Households thus move about half as much as the typical US household. The diﬀerence arises because
the households in our model are either owners or short-term renters who are actively searching for a new
house to own (the average rental period is 6 months). We do not capture movements between rental units
or moves between ownership and longer rental periods early or late in life, for example. This also explains
why the fraction of renters (3 percent) in the model is much smaller than in the US population (about one
third.)
9a one time unanticipated shock that makes all renters — 3 percent of the total population —
optimistic about future prices. In particular, renters believe that the value of the house is
given by a price dividend ratio of 19 — the value at the top of the boom in 2005 — rather than
by the steady state value of 16. However, once renters are matched and purchase a house,
they realize that the dividend stream is simply the one for happy owners, and so they turn
into happy owners themselves.
Figure 3 shows the behavior of prices and volume in a boom generated by the 3 percent
households who become optimistic renters. The dark line in the left hand panel is the average
home sale price. The average price increases to 19 on impact and then gradually reverts to
the steady state value of 16. The dark line in the right hand panel shows home sales as a
percent of all homes, at an annual rate. Sales are initially higher than in the steady state,
and also gradually revert. The model thus captures the fact that home sales increase during
housing booms. Here we have chosen the parameter α =0 .57 in order for sales on impact
to rise to the rate observed at the top of the boom in 2005, 9.5 percent.
Home sales occur both when a seller meets an optimist, and when a seller meets a “sober”
household. In the former case, the seller charges the optimist his valuation of 19. The price
that a seller charges a sober household is shown as a light dashed line. It is always close to
the steady state value of 16, although initially it is slightly higher. The average price mostly
reﬂects the composition of the renter population. Initially, almost all renters are optimists
and the price is close to 19. Later, more optimists have bought, and more sober households
have become renters, resulting in a lower average price.
During the ﬁr s tt h r e em o n t h so ft h eb o o m ,t h e r ea r es u ﬃciently many optimists in the
market that some happy owners also put their home on the market, in the hope of selling to
an optimist at an inﬂated price. (In this phase, happy owners are indiﬀerent between putting
10the house for sale or not, and play a mixed strategy.) This is why home sales are much higher
in this phase than their steady state rate of 6 percent. Moreover, since all happy owners
take the same action, this means in particular that some houses that have just been bought
are immediately put back on the market. The light line shows the rate at which houses are
“ﬂipped”. House ﬂipping also explains why sellers initially charge sober households a price
higher the steady state value of 16: the seller, who has the bargaining power, appropriates
the ﬂippers’ speculative gain.
The bottom line from the exercise is that a small fraction of optimistic households can
have a large price impact, even if they buy only a small fraction of houses during a modest
increase in trading volume. Three features of the model are important for these results.
First, the price is set in a bilateral negotiation. The transaction price for a purchase by an
optimist thus reﬂects the optimist’s valuation. Second, optimists account for a large share
of transactions so that they drive the average transaction price. Importantly, optimists can
account for a large share of transactions even though they make up only 3 percent of the
population. Finally, there are suﬃcient transaction costs so that happy owners do not ﬂood
the market with houses. This keeps trading volume low.
11References
Krainer, John. “A Theory of Liquidity in Residential Real Estate Markets.”
Journal of Urban Economics 2001, 49, pp. 32-53.
Miller, Edwards. “Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion.” Journal of Finance 1977,
32(4), pp. 1151-68.
Wheaton, William C. “Vacancy, Search, and Prices in a Housing Market Matching Model.”
Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 98(6), pp. 1270-92.
12Footnote
∗Piazzesi: Stanford University and NBER. Department of Economics, Stanford Univer-
sity, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94024. piazzesi@stanford.edu. Schneider: Stanford Uni-
versity and NBER. Department of Economics, Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford,
CA 94024. schneidr@stanford.edu. We thank Bob Hall and Luigi Guiso for comments.


























14Figure 1. Top panel: Housing price-dividend ratio for the United States. Bottom panel:





































Figure 2: Search model implications for prices and home sales with 3 percent optimistic
renters.
16cluster 1 cluster 2 cluster 3
early boom phase, years 2002 and 2003
cluster probability 0.26 0.64 0.10
next-year forecasts: + same — + same — + same —
business conditions 0.31 0.47 0.22 0.44 0.42 0.14 0.45 0.38 0.17
interest rates 0.49 0.35 0.16 0.49 0.39 0.12 0.47 0.43 0.10
inﬂation 0.36 0.36 0.28 0.35 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33
views about housing: + no mention — + no mention — + no mention —
credit 0.03 0.85 0.12 1 0 0 0.61 0.39 0
current house prices 0.16 0.61 0.23 0.17 0.81 0.02 0.03 0.97 0
future house prices 0 0.97 0.03 0 1 0 0.99 0 0.01
mean, max s.e. 0.0104, 0.0392 0.0037, 0.0064 0.0106, 0.0153
late boom phase, years 2004 and 2005
cluster probability 0.27 0.57 0.16
next-year forecasts: + same — + same — + same —
business conditions 0.19 0.51 0.30 0.35 0.49 0.16 0.34 0.47 0.19
interest rates 0.75 0.19 0.06 0.74 0.22 0.04 0.78 0.19 0.03
inﬂation 0.36 0.38 0.26 0.33 0.38 0.29 0.32 0.40 0.28
views about housing: + no mention — + no mention — + no mention —
credit 0 0.79 0.21 0.88 0.11 0.01 0.52 0.48 0
current house prices 0.08 0.42 0.50 0.13 0.84 0.03 0.03 0.97 0
future house prices 0.01 0.89 0.10 0 1 0 0.99 0 0.01
mean, max s.e. 0.0120, 0.0234 0.0058, 0.0166 0.0075, 0.012
17Table 1: Cluster analysis for Michigan Survey of Consumers. For next-year forecasts of
business conditions, interest rates, and inﬂation, the answer "+" means higher/better, while
"—" means lower/worse. For views about housing, "+" supports the view that now is a good
time to buy, while "-" supports the opposite view. Here, "no mention" refers to the case
where this argument was not mentioned by the household. "mean s.e." are average standard
errors for parameter estimates in the cluster, "max s.e." are the largest standard errors in
the cluster.
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